March 12, 1987
A massive fire destroyed two large warehouse complexes
and resulted in thedeaths of three members of the Detroit
Fire Department on March 12, 1987. Thecircumstances were
particularly unusual in the fact that the fatalitiesresulted
from two separate incidents, in different buildings, almost
3 hoursapart. The manner in which the fire conditions changed
very rapidly,resulting in one fatality and several injuries,
is also unusual and couldeasily have resulted in several
additional fire fighter deaths.The Detroit Fire Department
has determined that this fire resulted from an actof arson
and a suspect has been charged with 3 counts of homicide.
Thisreport does not address the cause and origin aspects
of the investigation. Itis intended to describe the situation
that was faced by the forces involved infire supression
operations and the circumstances that resulted in thefatalities.This
report is for informational purposes only.
The fire scene was approximately two miles northwest of
the downtown businessarea in a warehouse district, one block
from the Detroit Fire DepartmentTraining Academy. It involved
two adjacent warehouse complexes, eachconstructed in several
phases between approximately 1900 and 1920. Thebuildings
in the north complex were abandoned, while the south complex
wasoccupied by an operating paper products distributing
company. The twocomplexes were separated by an entrance
alley, approximately 20 ft. wide, thatprovided entry to
a large yard area. This was the only access to the yardwith
the other sides blocked by buildings, railroad tracks and
retaining walls.NORTH COMPLEXThe north complex consisted
of an L-shaped 3-story warehouse, with fullbasement, facing
the frontage road of I-96, attached to a 4-story warehouse
onthe northeast corner of the complex. A fenced-in vacant
lot on the northwestcorner of the property was covered with
old tires.The 3-story buildings were heavy timber construction
with numerous verticalopenings for freight elevators, conveyors
and stairs. The front section was190 ft. x 90 ft., divided
down the middle by a fire wall. The sectionextending east
was 300 ft. x 50 ft. With an intermediate fire wall at themid-point.
Many of the fire doors were missing or damaged, negating
anyeffective horizontal or vertical separations in this
part of the complex. The4-story section was 230 ft. x 100
ft. constructed of reinforced poured-inplace concrete. The
buildings were separated by a covered shipping area,approximately
20 ft. wide and spanned by 3 crossover bridges. A railroad
siding, on top of a concrete viaduct, ran along the south
side of the 3-storysection at the second floor level.The
buildings had been protected by automatic sprinklers, but
the system wasinoperative and had been partially dismantled,
including removal of thesprinkler heads and the elevated
storage tank.The 3-story section was formerly occupied by
a wiping Cloth distributor andwas left heavily stocked when
the company went out of business. The contentsincluded rags
in bales and crates, in addition to piles of discarded clothingand
materials. The bales were described as 5 ft. in diameter
and up to 8 ft.tall, bound in burlap. Some of these rags
may nave been oil soaked, adding tothe intensity of the
fire and rapid fire spread.The 4-story building was previously
used by a division of the same companythat dealt in used
rags and other bulk items. It was also abandoned, fullystocked
with combustible contents. Efforts to keep the abandoned
propertysecured had been unsuccessful and transients were
known to frequently occupythe buildings.Fire companies in
the area were aware of the risk and had conducted severalfamiliarization
tours of the buildings. During these tours, the hazards
ofopen passages between floors had been noted and firefighters
had movedcontents to cover several floor openings they considered
hazardous. At leastone fire had occurred previously in the
buildings and fire fightersanticipated another, sooner or
later. Many of the personnel responding on thefirst alarm
had toured the building in the previous month.
The property had been abandoned in 1982 and came under state
control for backtaxes. The City of Detroit had awarded a
contract for its demolition and thecontractor was scheduled
to begin work within a few days after the fire.SOUTH COMPLEXThe
south complex was occupied by a paper products distribution
company. Thissection included 3-story warehouse sections
and additiona? sections of 1 and 2stories, forming a triangle
with frontages of 320 ft. along the I-96 accessroad, 300
ft. facing the yard area and 400 ft. along the railroad
embankmentto the south. The railroad tracks coincided with
the 2nd floor level on thesouth side.The front of the paper
company's buildings had been covered with a metalfacade,
obscuring the age and complexity of the structures, but
these factorswere plainly visible from the sides and rear.
The construction included steelframe and heavy timber sections,
divided by several fire walls and protectedby automatic
sprinklers. The contents included paper and plastic products,including
packing materials and consumer goods.Examination of the
scene, after the fire, reveals that the brick constructionin
both complexes was of inferior quality, presenting a high
risk for earlycollapse. The brick work included many irregularities
and no visiblereinforcing, with evident gaps between the
double and triple courses of brick.The construction had
taken place over several years, resulting in complicatedarrangements
of buildings and many construction features that could not
beseen from the exterior.
The fire was reported in the abandoned section of the complex
at 1506 hours onMarch 12, 1987. A first alarm assignment
consisting of 3 engine companies,one ladder company, a squad
and Battalion Chief was dispatched and the firstdue ladder
company arrived within 2 minutes. Ladder 9, responding from
itsquarters at the Training Academy, one block away, had
a view of the north andeast faces of the buildings as they
approached. They arrived, reporting asmall amount of light
smoke showing from the southeast corner 3rd floorwindows.The
first arriving companies had to force entry through the
front doors andthen made their way via an unenclosed interior
stairway to the top floor. Atthis level they found at least
two small fires in trash and rags toward thesouth end of
the floor area. They went to a window and dropped a rope,intending
to pull a 1 l/2 inch nose line up to the 3rd floor. The
fire didnot appear to be threatening at this point and the
crews anticipated a quickand easy job of extinguishment.Very
suddenly, the conditions on the 3rd floor changed dramatically.
A heavyfront of smoke and flame rolled over on the interior
crews, forcing them toabandon their positions and retreat
toward the stairs. One fire fighter,looking through a doorway
to the adjoining sections, reported a mass of flamesapproaching
rapidly. There are indications that an additional fire,
possiblyset on a lower floor toward the middle of the east-west
wing, had reached theflashover stage and was rapidly engulfing
the entire 3rd floor. A total of 8fire fighters were on
the 3rd floor when the flasnover occurred, forcing themto
crawl back toward the stairway. Two managed to dive down
the stairs andescaped with hand and facial burns and other
injuries. One went out a windowto an aerial ladder, but
5 could not reach the stairs and were trapped by theflashover.
The firefighters found their way to windows in the northwest
quadrant of thebuilding and called for help. One lieutenant
lost his grip while hanging outa window and fell, striking
a ledge at the 2nd floor level and landing headfirst on
the street below. Other firefighters initiated CPR and transportedhim
in a fire investigator's sedan to a hospital where he was
pronounced deadon arrival.While a ground ladder was being
raised, a second fire fighter fell, striking alarge telephone
line and landing on the street With a fractured elbow andshoulder.
Two were rescued with an extension ladder from a front window
whilea master stream was used to protect another, hanging
onto the sill of a windowaround the corner. To reach him,
a snort ladder had to be used to scale achain link fence
into the vacant yard and a 45 ft. extension ladder was passedover
and raised.All of the fire fighters were wearing full protective
clothing, includingcoats and helmets that complied with
NFPA standards, leather gloves and 3/4length rubber boots.
Most wore SCBA's on their backs and four were able todon
their face pieces as they crawled toward the stairs, including
the two whofell. Several of the firefighters received 1st
and 2nd degree burns to theirhands, wrists, thighs and necks.
Exposure PriorityWhen conditions began to deteriorate, the
Battalion Chief immediately calledfor a 2nd Alarm at 1519
hours. This was followed by a 3rd Alarm at 1522, a4th Alarm
at 1530 and a 5th Alarm at 1538 hours. Requests for additionalcompanies
escalated the response to the equivalent of 7 alarms as
flamesrapidly engulfed the entire 3-story building. The
Deputy Fire Chief,responding on the 3rd Alarm, assumed command
and attempted to deploy companiesto confine the fire. A
ladder company, assigned to set up a master stream atthe
east end (Lawton Street) of the building could not operate
in an effectiveposition because of the imminent danger of
wall collapse, while companiescould not use the alley entrance
to the yard because of the collapsing wall atthat end of
the fire building. A railroad viaduct at the 2nd floor levelseverely
restricted access on the east side of the fire building
and handlineshad to be stretched by hand into the yard area,
over a retaining wall andfence, to apply water on the south
side.As the flames raged on the heavy fuel load of the rag
warehouse, the exposedpaper warehouse was quickly ignited.
Moments after the rescue of the trappedfirefighters was
completed, flames were visible under the eaves and in theexposed
windows, at the alley opening. Companies were sent to the
roof andinterior to attempt to stop extension with handlines,
while elevated masterstreams were set-up to cover the exposure
from the front, including a towerladder set-up on the freeway
off ramp in front of the complex.
This holding action was successful in the front part of
the building, butflames soon overwhelmed the sprinkler system
and broke through the roof of thenext section to the east.
The portions of the warehouse that were beyond thereach
of elevated streams received a heavy exposure from radiant
heat, flyingbrands and internal extension, resulting in
full involvement of the northeastsection of the paper products
warehouse. Handlines and portable master streamdevices were
moved onto the railroad right-of-way to attack the growing
fireand the Deputy Chief ordered all personnel out of the
warehouse, because ofthe danger of structural collapse.With
3-story warehouses now fully involved around three sides
of the yard, theoperation went into a long duration defensive
mode. The unusually high fuelload in both complexes created
intense thermal columns and showered the areato the east
with flying brands. Several small fires were handled by
enginecompanies and citizens with garden hoses, up to 3
blocks down wind.STRUCTURAL COLLAPSEApproximately 2 hours
into the defensive battle, companies working along theeast
side of the paper warehouse began to approach the burning
3-story sectionover the roof tops of the uninvolved Z-story
sections. Near the middle of thebuilding they found an area
where the roof had burned off and the 3rd floorcontents
were partially burned. It is believed that the fire in this
area hadbeen controlled by an elevated stream, operated
from the front of thebuilding. This section was separated
by a fire wall from the fully involvedsection to the east.
Members of two companies made their way from the adjoining
rooftop into the3rd floor area where they picked up and
extended handlines that had beenabandoned earlier. Three
members of one company were working near a firewall, overhauling
debris, when a section of parapet collapsed without warningat
1758 hours. This wall was free standing at the time, since
roof structureson both sides had burned away and an intense
fire was burning on the otherside.Two members were caught
by the falling wall, which collapsed the 3rd and 2ndfloors
down into the 1st floor. and were trapped in a pile of debrisapproximately
1.2 ft deep in the unburned ground floor area. The remainingmember
of the company called for help and made his way downstairs
to begindigging for the victims. He was joined by numerous
other firefighters as theword of men trapped was announced
over the fireground radio channel.The Deputy Fire Chief
organized a rescue effort with crews digging out bricksand
debris by hand. This effort actually took place inside the
ground floorwarehouse area and efforts to limit the number
of personnel exposed to thedanger of further collapse were
hampered by the urgency to rescue trappedcomrades. While
this operation was in progress, the application of water
wasseverely curtailed, to avoid causing further collapse
of the structure. Anadditional assignment of fresh companies
was called to assist in the rescueoperation.The rescue effort
took more than one hour, resulting in the recovery of thebodies
of a 58 year old lieutenant and 20 year old probationary
firefighter. At the time of the body recovery, the Deputy
Fire Chief wascontemplating removing all crews, because
of deteriorating fire conditions,and as soon as the operation
was completed the building was abandoned.By this time the
fire had extended into most of the Z-story sections of thepaper
warehouse and total destruction was unavoidable. All crews
withdrew tosafe positions and master stream operations were
continued for almost 24hours. Late on the following afternoon,
the contractor who held thedemolition contract was called
in to level the unsafe walls of both complexes.LESSONS LEARNED1.
The buildings involved in this fire were heavily loaded
with highlycombustible contents. The arrangement of the
buildings createdconditions that were ripe for very rapid
fire growth and spread,particularly in the building of fire
origin where the automaticsprinkler system had been rendered
imoperative and fire doors and wallswere compromised. These
factors must be noted during pre-fire planningvisits and
responding companies must be prepared to deal with extremelyrapid
fire growth conditions.2. Vacant buildings often present
an attractive nuisance to members ofsociety who engage in
the crime of arson, either for profit or for moreunpredictable
motives. Where these problems exist, companies shouldmake
a priority of pre-fire planning and familiarizing themselves
withaccess, Contents, special hazards and hidden traps that
may be critical
in a firefighting operation. Efforts must also be directed
towardhaving abandoned buildings secured or demolished as
quickly aspossible. The actions of an arsonist are truly
unpredictable. Firefighters encountering obvious arson situations
must be particularlyvigilant for multiple points of origin,
accelerants, and other factorsthat could cause rapid changes
in fire conditions.3. The contents of the rag warehouse
were not only highly combustible, butalso obstructed access
through the storage areas and prevented firefighters from
finding the stairway when the unexpected flashoveroccurred.
When encountering conditions of this nature, the use ofguide
ropes or hoselines to lead the way back to an exit should
beseriously considered.4. When fighting any type of fire,
the officer in command mustconsistantly be aware of the
risk to personnel, and question whetherthe potential results
justify the risk. No building is worth the lifeof a fire
fighter and abandoned or substantially destroyed buildings
donot justify risking personnel under any circumstances.
This must beweighed in context, however, as it is not realistic
to allow any firein an abandoned building to burn unchecked.
If manageable fires arecreate a much greater risk to fire
fighters andnot controlled in the ir early stages, they
will inevitab ly grow tomajor proportions andthe community.
5. On their arrival, fire fighters encountered a situation
that did notappear to present any significant danger. When
the flashover occurred,they were very suddenly subjected
to intense heat and flames, as wellas zero-visibility smoke
conditions. Those members who had their SelfContained Breathing
Apparatus on their backs, had time to don theirface pieces
as they crawled from the danger. Those who did not haveSCBA's,
at least on their backs, were suddenly in extreme danger
andwere lucky to survive.Whatever the situation, company
officers must take basic precautions,including:Identifying
secondary means of escape.Ensuring that all personnel are
wearing full protective clothing andSCBA.Maintaining accountability
for all crew members at all times.Constantly being aware
of their surroundings and changing conditions.Being trained
to react to unanticipated emergency conditions.6. Large
scale operations, such as this one, require strong centralizedcommand
to establish and communicate the basic strategy that will
beemployed and to coordinate operations. This must be supported
by afire ground organization that controls the tactical
position andfunction of all operating units and monitors
safety conditions, inaccordance with the stratetic plan.
This requires sufficientcommand-level officers and effective
communications to perform theessential tasks.
Offensive and defensive fire fighting operations must never
be mixed orconfused. When a fire is being managed in a defensive
mode, allpersonnel must be aware of the strategic plan and
stay out of theuninvolved area until re-entry is authorized
by the officer in Commandof the incident. "Free lance"
operations must not be allowed.7. The inherent structural
weaknesses of a building may or may not beplainly visible.
Potential weak points should be noted during pre-fireplanning
and inspection visits. Safety officers should be assigned
tomonitor the operation and to evaluate conditions as they
areencountered and all personnel should be able to recognize
signs ofweakness or impending collapse.8. The urgency of
a rescue operation may cause firefighters to acceptsevere
risks and to endanger themselves in large numbers. The risk
ofadditional losses must be weighed against the chances
of a successfulrescue. The loss of control may escalate
a tragic situation into amajor disaster.The "lessons
learned" listed in this report should not be interpreted
ascriticism of the Detroit Fire Department or of any of
the individuals involvedin this incident. This fire presented
an extremely unusual combination ofcircumstances that had
a devastating effect on a very competent andexperienced
fire department. The incident involved heroic actions and
tragicresults that were felt throughout the Detroit Fire
Department and throughoutthe fire service. These lessons
should be taken as reminders that firefighters must never
relax their attention to basic safety procedures and mustalways
be prepared to deal With a situation that changes from routine
tocritical without warning.
This report was prepared by J. Gordon Routley, Chairman
of the Health andSafety Committee of the International Association
of Fire Chiefs and by Tri-Data Corporation, for the United
States Fire Administration. The cooperationof the Phoenix
Fire Department in making Mr. Routley available for thisproject
is acknowledged.In addition, the cooperation of Commissioner
Melvin Jefferson and the membersof the Detro it Fire Department
is greatly appreciated.
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