THE FIRE 2
| Water Supply Problems
The normal attack hose lines used by the Philadelphia
Fire Department incorporate 1 3/4-inch hose lines
with automatic fog nozzles designed to provide variable
gallonage at 100 psi nozzle pressure. The pressure
reducing valves in the standpipe outlets provided
less than 60 psi discharge pressure, which was insufficient
to develop effective fire streams. The pressure reducing
values (PRVs) were field adjustable using a special
tool. However, not until several hours into the fire
did a technician knowledgeable in the adjustment technique
arrive at the fire scene and adjust the pressure on
several of the PRVs in the stairways.
When the PRVs were originally installed, the pressure
settings were improperly adjusted. Index values marked
on the valves did not correspond directly to discharge
pressures. To perform adjustments the factory and
field personnel had to refer to tables in printed
installation instructions to determine the proper
setting for each floor level.4 For more detailed information
about PRVs see Appendices D and E.
Several fire department pumpers were connected to
the Fire Department connections to the standpipe system
in an attempt to increase the water pressure. The
improperly set PRVs effectively prevented the increased
pressure in the standpipes from being discharged through
the valves. The limited water supply prevented significant
progress in fighting the fire and limited interior
forces to operating from defensive positions in the
stairwells. During the next hour the fire spread to
the 23rd and 24th floors primarily through autoexposure,
while firefighters were unable to make entry onto
these floors due to deteriorating heat and smoke conditions
and the lack of water pressure in their hose lines.
Windows on the 22nd floor broke out and the 23rd and
24th floor windows were subject to autoexposure from
flames lapping up the sides of the building.
On the street below pedestrians were cleared from
the area because of falling glass and debris as more
and more windows were broken out by the fire. Additional
hose lines were connected to the standpipe connections,
attempting to boost the water pressure in the system.
However, the design of the PRVs did not allow the
higher pressures to reach the interior hose streams.
Additional alarms were requested to bring a five-alarm
assignment to the scene. |
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Three Firefighters Lost
As firefighters attempted to make entry to the burning
floors from the stairways, heavy smoke continued to
build up within the stair shafts and banked down from
the upper floors. An engine company was assigned to
attempt to open a door or hatch to ventilate the stairways
at the roof level to allow the smoke and heat to escape.
A Captain and two firefighters from Engine 11 started
up the center stair from the 22nd floor with this
assignment. Engine 11 subsequently radioed that they
had left the stairway and were disoriented in heavy
smoke on the 30th floor. Attempts were made to direct
the crew by radio to one of the other stairways.
Shortly thereafter a radio message was received at
the Command Post from Engine 11’s Captain requesting
permission to break a window for ventilation. This
was followed moments later by a message from a crew
The pressure reducing valves in the vicinity of the
fire floor (floors 18 through 20) were set at “80”
on the valve index which corresponded to a discharge
pressure between 55 and 57 psi, depending on the elevation.
This would provide a nozzle pressure of 40 to 45 psi
at the end of a 150 to 200 foot hose line. member
of Engine 11 reporting that “the Captain is
down.” Approval was given to break the window
and rescue efforts were initiated to search for the
crew. Search teams were sent from below and a helicopter
was requested to land a team on the roof. The search
teams were able to reach the 30th floor, which was
enveloped in heavy smoke, but were unable to find
the missing firefighters. They then searched the floors
above without success. An eight member search team
became disoriented and ran out of air in the mechanical
area on the 38th floor, while trying to find an exit
to the roof. They were rescued by the team that had
landed on the roof and were transported back to ground
level by the helicopter. |
Several attempts were made to continue the search, until
helicopter operations on the rooftop had to be suspended
due to the poor visibility and the thermal drafts caused
by the heat of the fire. The helicopter crew then attempted
an exterior search, using the helicopter’s searchlight,
and at 0117 located a broken window on the southeast comer
of the 28th floor, in an area that could not be seen from
any of the surrounding streets. Another rescue team was
assembled and finally located the three missing member just
inside the broken window on the 28th floor at approximately
0215. At that time the fire was burning on the 24th and
25th floors and extending to the 26th.
The victims were removed to the Medical Triage Area on
the 20th floor, but resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful
and they were pronounced dead at the scene. An estimated
three to four hours had elapsed since they had reported
that they were in trouble and all had succumbed to smoke
inhalation.’
The three deceased members of Engine Company 11 were Captain
David P. Holcombe (age 52), Firefighter Phyllis McAllister
(43), and Firefighter James A. Chappell (29).
Prior to being assigned to this task, the crew had walked
up to the fire area wearing their full protective clothing
and SCBAs and carrying extra equipment. It is believed that
they started out with full SCBA cylinders, but it is not
known if they became disoriented from the heavy
5 The exact time that Engine 11 was assigned to attempt
ventilation and the time the crew reported they were in
trouble are not known, since the tactical radio channel
they were using is not recorded and detailed time records
of this event were not maintained during the incident. Estimates
from individuals who were involved suggest that the assignment
was made between 2130 and 2200 hours and search efforts
were initiated between 2200 and 2230 hours. The bodies were
located at approximately 0215 hours. smoke in the stairway,
encountered trouble with heat build-up, or were exhausted
by the effort of climbing 28 floors. Some combination of
these factors could have caused their predicament. Unfortunately,
even after breaking the window they did not find relief
from the smoke conditions which were extremely heavy in
that part of the building.
Continuing Efforts to Improve Water Supply
Because of the difficulty in obtaining an adequate water
supply, a decision was made to stretch 5-inch lines up the
stairs to supply interior attack lines. The first line was
stretched up the west (#l) stairwell to the 24th floor level
and was operational by 0215, approximately six hours into
the fire. At 0221, a 12th alarm was sounded to stretch a
second line, in the center (#2) stair. At 0455, a third
5-inch line was ordered stretched, in the east (#3) stair.
The operation in the east stair was discontinued at the
17th /floor level at 0600. While the 5-inch lines were being
stretched, a sprinkler contractor arrived at the scene and
began manually adjusted the pressure reducing valves on
the standpipe connections. This improved the discharge pressure
in the hoses supplied by the standpipe system, finally providing
normal handline streams for the interior fire suppression
crews. At this point, however, the fire involved several
floors and could not be contained with manual hose streams.
Firefighting Operations Suspended
All interior firefighting efforts were halted after almost
11 hours of uninterrupted fire in the building. Consultation
with a structural engineer and structural damage observed
by units operating in the building led to the belief that
there was a possibility of a pancake structural collapse
of the fire damaged floors. Bearing this risk in mind along
with the loss of three personnel and the lack of progress
against the fire despite having secured adequate water pressure
and flow for interior fire streams, an order was given to
evacuate the building at 0700 on February 24. At the time
of the evacuation, the fire appeared to be under control
on the 22nd though 24th floors. It continued to bum on floors
25 and 26 and was spreading upward. There was a heavy smoke
condition throughout most of the upper floors. The evacuation
was completed by 0730.
After evacuating the building, portable master streams
directed at the fire building from several exposures, including
the Girard Building #l and One Centre Plaza, across the
street to the west were the only firefighting efforts left
in place.
Fire Stopped
The fire was stopped when it reached the 30th floor, which
was protected by automatic sprinklers. As the fire ignited
in different points this floor level through the floor assembly
and by autoexposure through the windows, 10 sprinkler heads
activated and the fires were extinguished at each point
of penetration. The vertical spread of the fire was stopped
solely by the action of the automatic sprinkler system,
which was being supplied by Fire Department pumpers. The
30th floor was not heavily damaged by fire, and most contents
were salvageable. The fire was declared under control at
3:Ol p.m., February 24, 1991. |
